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Sharing the Global Climate Finance Effort
Fairly with Limited Coordination
•
Jonathan Pickering, Frank Jotzo, and Peter J. Wood
Abstract
Mobilizing climate finance for developing countries is crucial for achieving a fair and
effective global climate regime. To date, developed countries retain wide discretion over
their national contributions. We explore how different degrees of international coor-
dination may influence the fairness of the global financing effort, and we present quan-
titative scenarios, for both the metrics used to distribute the collective effort among
countries contributing funding, and the number of contributing countries. We find that
an intermediate degree of coordination—combining nationally determined financing
pledges with a robust international review mechanism—may reduce distortions in
relative efforts as well as shortfalls in overall funding, while reflecting reasonable differ-
ences over what constitutes a fair share. A broader group of contributors may do little to
improve adequacy or equity unless it can converge on credible measures of responsibility
and capacity. Our analysis highlights the importance of building common understand-
ings about effort sharing.
Climate finance remains one of the main unresolved issues in global climate
change negotiations. Mobilizing finance to address climate change will be crucial
for engaging developing countries in global efforts to cut greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Funding commitments by wealthy countries may promote equity in global
climate governance by ensuring a fairer distribution of the costs of reducing
emissions and adjusting to the impacts of rising temperatures, and by demon-
strating good faith on the part of developed countries. Conversely, if wealthy
countries fail to fulfill the commitment they made in 2009 to mobilize $100 bil-
lion a year in climate finance by 2020, the climate regime’s credibility will suffer
lasting damage. Even if countries achieve the commitment, this is likely to meet
only a portion of developing countries’ financing needs.1 Although developed
countries have pledged over $10 billion to a new UN Green Climate Fund, over-
all levels of funding remain insufficient to assure poorer countries that wealthy
countries are on track to meet the 2020 target.2 These concerns are likely to
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intensify as countries negotiate on a more ambitious global response to climate
change beyond 2020.
The challenge is to raise enough funding to meet the collective commit-
ment without disproportionately burdening some countries and demanding
too little of others. Despite having agreed on a collective financing target, dev-
eloped countries have not formalized arrangements for sharing the financing
effort. Governments of contributing countries retain wide discretion over the
size and sources of their national contribution. Meanwhile, some countries not
formally obligated to contribute to climate finance—including Korea, Mexico,
and several Latin American countries—have announced voluntary pledges to the
Green Climate Fund, but debate persists over whether and how the pool of
contributors should expand further.
Would a greater degree of international coordination enhance the fairness
of effort-sharing arrangements in climate finance? This question speaks to a
broader debate in global environmental governance about ways in which dif-
ferent degrees of international coordination may affect various measures of
institutional evaluation, including equity and legitimacy.3 We frame this article’s
analysis in terms of a spectrum commonly invoked in climate governance, rang-
ing from highly coordinated or centralized (“top-down”) to uncoordinated or
highly decentralized (“bottom-up”) approaches.4
Nuanced evaluation of top-down and bottom-up approaches has been
hampered by caricatured distinctions, rather than recognizing that a variety of
intermediate approaches combining bottom-up and top-down elements may be
possible.5 Climate finance also raises distinct distributive issues that analyses of
national mitigation (i.e., reducing greenhouse gas emissions) do not fully en-
capsulate, not least because finance encompasses adaptation (i.e., adjusting to
the impacts of climate change) as well as mitigation.6 Our analysis seeks to
advance understanding of these underdeveloped areas of the literature through
a finer-grained evaluation of coordination plus the perspective of equity. Our
analysis points to considerable commonalities between national mitigation
and finance on these aspects, but we highlight important differences between
them, including the relationship between aggregate and national targets, and
the role of prior commitments in informing expectations about current pledges.
Accordingly, the degree of coordination required for financing may not neces-
sarily be the same as that for mitigation.
We begin by outlining equity considerations relevant to climate finance
and applying findings regarding how different degrees of coordination may
affect equity. Then we explore the implications of differing degrees of coordina-
tion along two important dimensions of the effort-sharing problem: the criteria
3. Biermann et al. 2009; Eckersley 2012.
4. Stavins et al. 2014, 1021.
5. Dubash and Rajamani 2010.
6. Ciplet et al. 2013, 53.
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and metrics used to apportion efforts among the countries contributing to the
global effort, and the number of contributing countries. For each dimension, we
present quantitative analysis to illustrate how the distribution of effort may shift
according to different coordination scenarios. We complement the quantitative
analysis with qualitative analysis of recent initiatives to raise multilateral envi-
ronmental finance.
We find that, compared to present arrangements, a greater degree of coor-
dination on both dimensions of effort sharing will be essential for securing ad-
equate, fair funding. However, formulaic or highly top-down approaches to
determining the size of the contributing group or the distribution of national
efforts are likely to encounter resistance from developing and developed coun-
tries. We argue that a hybrid approach—combining nationally driven financing
pledges with a robust review mechanism that helps to build common under-
standings about effort-sharing criteria—is best suited to promoting equity, ad-
equacy, and feasibility.
Fairness in Climate Finance: Concepts and Criteria
Under the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed-country parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, or “the Con-
vention”) committed to provide climate finance approaching US$30 billion be-
tween 2010 and 2012 (“fast-start finance”) and to mobilize long-term finance of
US$100 billion a year by 2020.7 Since the UNFCCC has not reached an agreed
definition of what should count as climate finance, we take as our starting point
the broad definition set out by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC): “financial flows whose expected effect is to reduce net [greenhouse gas]
emissions and/or to enhance resilience to the impacts of climate variability and
the projected climate change.”8 Given our focus on fulfilling existing multilat-
eral commitments, we limit our analysis to a subset of total climate finance—
namely finance for mitigation and adaptation invested in developing countries
that is mobilized by developed countries.9
An emerging body of literature has sought to identify principles for eval-
uating the fairness of institutions for governing climate finance.10 We use the term
“fairness” to refer to even-handed, proportionate, or non-arbitrary treatment of
persons and groups in the distribution of goods or the satisfaction of moral
claims.11 Although some research assigns a narrower meaning to the term “equity”
than to “fairness,” it is common to employ the two terms interchangeably.12 We
take fairness and equity to have two features in common: a substantive dimension
7. UNFCCC 2009, Paragraph 8.
8. Gupta et al. 2014, 1212; see also UNFCCC 2014, 5.
9. Gupta et al. 2014, 1212.
10. See, e.g., Ballesteros et al. 2010; Ciplet et al. 2013; Schalatek 2012.
11. Compare Rawls 1999, 5.
12. Kolstad et al. 2014, 259.
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relating to the fairness of the outcome of the institution or policy in question, as
well as a procedural dimension relating to the fairness of the associated decision-
making and implementation processes.13
Scholarly analysis of substantive fairness in climate finance commonly
invokes the principle contained in the Convention of Parties’ “common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” for protecting the
climate system.14 According to this principle, national governments should
contribute climate finance in accordance with their responsibility for causing
the problem of climate change and their economic capacity to raise funds.15
Substantive fairness in effort sharing requires not only fairness among the
contributing countries, but also arrangements that do not either unduly shift
the burden of raising funds onto recipient countries or divert other resources
(such as development assistance) that contributors have pledged for recipient
countries. Substantive fairness in climate finance extends beyond effort sharing
to questions of the fair allocation of funding among and within recipient
countries, but detailed analysis of this allocation is beyond the scope of this
article.16
Although our analysis focuses primarily on substantive fairness, pursuing
this goal may give rise to trade-offs with other important criteria for institutional
evaluation, including procedural fairness, effectiveness, and feasibility. We take
procedural fairness to require at a minimum that effort-sharing arrangements are
transparent and accountable; represent the interests of the affected parties, in-
cluding those of both the contributing and recipient countries; and are reached
through authentic deliberation—that is, deliberation that is truthful, mutually
respectful, and noncoercive.17
At the level of climate policy overall, effectiveness is often interpreted in
terms of environmental outcomes, such as the ability of a given policy to avoid
dangerous climate change.18 In the context of effort-sharing arrangements for
climate finance (if not the environmental outcomes of financed activities), effec-
tiveness is best understood in terms of “adequacy.”19 That is, effort-sharing
arrangements should fulfill the agreed-on collective funding targets and should
also be sufficient to address the unmet climate-related financing needs of de-
veloping countries. Understood this way, adequacy is not altogether separable
from fairness, since adequate financing contributes to the fair distribution between
developed and developing countries of the overall costs of addressing climate
change.
13. Shelton 2007, 640–641.
14. UNFCCC 1992, Article 3.1.
15. Ciplet et al. 2013, 55; Dellink et al. 2009.
16. See Ciplet et al. 2013.
17. See Biermann and Gupta 2011; Schalatek 2012, 961–963; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, 25.
18. Stavins et al. 2014, 1009.
19. UNFCCC 2009, Paragraph 8.
42 • Sharing the Global Climate Finance Effort Fairly with Limited Coordination
Finally, we take feasibility to refer to whether a particular institutional arrange-
ment is capable of being implemented, given economic, practical, or political
constraints such as finite resources, organizational path dependence, or public
acceptability.20
Evaluating Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to
Climate Governance
Recent scholarship has employed a number of contrasts to frame debates about
international coordination in global environmental governance, including top-
down versus bottom-up approaches, multilateral versus “minilateral” approaches,
and fragmented versus integrated governance.21 Typically each pair of terms refers
to the ends of a spectrum rather than to a binary contrast. Since our analysis focuses
primarily on the degree of international coordination needed to achieve fairness in
achieving an agreed multilateral target, we set aside some broader aspects of
debates on coordination, including the potential for national or subnational actors
to act on climate change in the absence of a multilateral framework22 or the
division of labor among international organizations in the climate regime.23
International climate agreements may be top-down or bottom-up on a
variety of dimensions.24 The dimensions most relevant to our analysis are the
objectives or targets for action, oversight standards, the range of countries par-
ticipating, and the metrics for effort sharing. A top-down approach would involve
uniform or centralized approaches to some or all of these dimensions, whereas
under a bottom-up approach, national governments would retain discretion to
determine these policy settings unilaterally.
Applying these dimensions to climate finance, the size of each country’s
national financing effort will depend on (1) the size of the collective funding
target (if any), (2) the types of funding that may be counted toward a national
government’s share of the collective target, (3) the size of the contributor group,
and (4) themethod of distributing shares among the contributor group.We briefly
review arguments in relation to each dimension, before exploring dimensions 3
and 4 in greater detail.
Collective Targets
Numerous commentators consider multilateral coordination to be more capable
of effectively addressing collective action problems such as climate change
mitigation than are loosely coordinated or unilateral approaches. Thus, Bill
20. Gilabert and Lawford-Smith 2012; Pickering et al. 2012.
21. See, respectively, Hare et al. 2010, Eckersley 2012, Biermann et al. 2009.
22. Hoffmann 2011; Ostrom 2010.
23. Keohane and Victor 2011; Zelli and van Asselt 2013.
24. Hare et al. 2010, 601.
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Hare and colleagues argue that only top-down approaches to mitigation can
circumvent the problem of free riders, thereby promoting both adequacy and
substantive fairness.25 Proponents of bottom-up approaches argue that trans-
national competition for clean technology investment may stimulate innovation
through experimentation and a “race to the top.”26
Mobilizing global climate finance likewise involves a collective action
problem and is therefore vulnerable to the risk that some countries will free-
ride on the pledges of others.27 Moreover, when a contributor’s pledges primarily
benefit other countries (some of whom may be economic competitors), the
argument of a “race to the top”may be less plausible, at least as long as countries’
interests in enhancing their international reputation are weaker than their eco-
nomic interests. For these reasons, multilateral coordination of a common financ-
ing goal is strongly preferable.
Oversight Mechanisms and Standards
The case for coordinated oversight (what the UNFCCC calls measurement, report-
ing, and verification) is likewise strong for both climate finance and national
mitigation efforts, and it attracts support from advocates of both top-down and
bottom-up approaches.28 Coordinated oversight typically involves centralized
institutional mechanisms for reporting on and reviewing progress, as well as
agreed multilateral standards for conducting those tasks. An important rationale
for coordinated oversight arrangements for finance and national mitigation is
that both those who bear the costs and those who benefit have an interest in
knowing how much effort governments are expending and whether that effort is
producing the desired results. Thus, even in the absence of agreed benchmarks
for effort sharing, coordinated oversight may promote substantive fairness (by
detecting and deterring free riding) as well as procedural fairness (by promoting
transparency and accountability, thereby facilitating deliberation).29
Ongoing disagreement between developed and developing countries over
whether and how certain types of flows should count toward the overall com-
mitment illustrates the risks associated with an uncoordinated approach to
setting oversight standards.30 The Copenhagen Accord gave wide discretion to
national governments over how they would fulfill their commitments, by stip-
ulating that longer-term funding would be drawn “from a wide variety of sources,
public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of
finance.”31 In practice, contributors have adopted widely different approaches
25. Hare et al. 2010, 604.
26. Hoffmann 2011; Keohane and Victor 2011; Ostrom 2010.
27. Bayer and Urpelainen 2013.
28. Bodansky 2011; Hare et al. 2010, 604, 607–608.
29. Hare et al. 2010, 607–608.
30. Ciplet et al. 2013.
31. UNFCCC 2009, Paragraph 8; UNFCCC 2011a, Paragraph 99.
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to accounting for public and private sources. This has prompted concerns from
developing countries that contributors may divert aid funding from purposes
that may be of greater immediate benefit for developing countries,32 or may
take credit for private finance that would have flowed to developing countries
even in the absence of the funding commitment.33 For these reasons, inten-
sive coordination will be necessary to develop credible standards for determin-
ing the eligibility of sources and how they should count toward the collective
target.
The Effort-Sharing Puzzle
Even if the case for coordinated goal setting and oversight is strong, the case for
coordinated effort sharing is more contested. Developing countries have argued
for a more systematic or coordinated approach to burden sharing as well as goal
setting, by proposing that commitments be based on a fixed percentage of each
developed country’s national income.34 Developing countries’ arguments to this
effect are often coupled with the idea that, due to the impacts of developed
countries’ historical emissions on developing countries, climate finance is a
matter of entitlement (or obligation) rather than of “charity,” and the discretion
of contributors must therefore be constrained.35
Wealthy countries—notably the US—have emphasized that they should
be entitled to a substantial degree of discretion in how they raise funds, and
have encouraged those beyond the existing group of contributors to make fund-
ing pledges.36 The EU, although apparently open to a more formulaic approach
to effort sharing, has emphasized its “fiscal sovereignty” in its choices about
funding sources.37 The idea of fiscal sovereignty not only reflects more general
notions of national sovereignty in international relations, but also embodies
the view that taxation and expenditure arrangements form part of the domestic
social contract between governments and their citizens.38 Accordingly, states
may be reluctant to cede discretion over how much they contribute to a sub-
stantial funding effort, because doing so may inhibit their ability to adjust bud-
getary allocations to respond to changing domestic priorities.
The funding that developed countries raised under the UNFCCC’s “fast-
start” finance commitment from 2010 to 2012 at first appears to provide little
support for the importance of coordinating shares within the contributing
group. Contributors announced their individual fast-start commitments in an
apparently ad-hoc fashion at the Copenhagen conference and in the months
32. Stadelmann et al. 2011.
33. Stadelmann et al. 2013.
34. South Centre 2011, 11.
35. UNFCCC 2011b.
36. Haites and Mwape 2013, 163; UNFCCC 2011c.
37. European Commission 2011; European Commission 2013.
38. Dietsch 2011.
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thereafter. As it happened, individual pledges were sufficient to cover the collec-
tive fast-start commitment (although a substantial proportion of funds pledged
had not yet flowed through to recipient countries by the end of the fast-start
period).39 On this basis, a bottom-up approach to effort sharing may appear
to be sufficient for securing adequate funding, because some countries may have
reputational motivations for unilaterally making up for shortfalls in the overall
commitment, as Japan and Norway did.40 In addition, the collective financing
pledges at Copenhagen fixed an overall distribution of the multilateral financing
effort between developed and developing countries. Because all contributing
countries were wealthy, ensuring fair shares within the contributing group
was arguably less important than if the group’s members had widely varying
incomes. By contrast, under the Copenhagen Accord both developed and devel-
oping countries put forward national mitigation pledges in the absence of a
fixed division of labor between the two groups.
Nevertheless, there are two reasons why the experience of the fast-start fi-
nance period may not provide a sufficient guide for future financing efforts.
First, when the stakes are considerably higher—as in the long-term finance com-
mitment, which requires a ten-fold increase in annual nominal amounts relative
to the fast-start period—it is less likely that countries will be able to rely upon
some countries’ unilateral action to bridge a substantial shortfall in collective
funding. Second, as we discuss below, expanding the contributing group to in-
clude a wider range of countries could enhance the adequacy of fundraising ef-
forts, but as the group becomes larger and more diverse, equity considerations
regarding relative shares within the group once again come to the fore.
Measuring Fair Shares
We now compare different degrees of coordination in effort sharing. Existing
research in this area has typically focused on the choice of effort-sharing metrics
but has not explicitly incorporated different coordination scenarios.41
Initially we take as fixed the existing list of countries with responsibilities
to provide climate finance under the UNFCCC, namely the Annex II (“devel-
oped”) parties. In the next section we investigate the implications of varying
the size of the contributor group. Our analysis is applicable not only to the
$100 billion commitment but also to a subset thereof (such as the share of pub-
lic finance in the overall commitment, or contributions to the Green Climate
Fund) or to a larger collective target. Our analysis is also neutral as to whether
national contributions are drawn from development assistance budgets or
other sources. However, holding the size of a national effort constant, a pledge
39. Nakhooda et al. 2013.
40. See Ciplet et al. 2012, 2.
41. See, e.g., Dellink et al. 2009; Petherick 2014.
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that redirects other funding intended for developing countries will diminish its
overall substantive fairness.
Scenarios for Metrics and Coordination
We begin by introducing a range of possible indicators that could guide decisions
about effort sharing. Table 1 shows illustrative shares for Annex II contributors,
disaggregated by the five largest contributors of fast-start finance. We use a range
of indicators based on the UNFCCC principle of parties’ “common but differen-
tiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,”measured in terms of national
emissions and income. We also include several indicators based on countries’
previous shares of funding for international purposes, because some contribu-
tors used these indicators as a guide to their fast-start finance contributions.42
For parsimony, we excluded from the presentation of results a number of
variations on the indicators outlined above. For the present analysis, we tested a
number of variations for emissions (e.g., excluding emissions from land use)
and income (e.g., market exchange rates), but found that these modifications
resulted in limited differences in the overall trends. Extending the time frame
for historical emissions to periods before 1990 increases developed countries’
share of global emissions, but the differences are moderate for most countries,
since around a third of cumulative global emissions between 1850 and 2010
occurred since 1990.43
We use the indicators outlined in Table 1 as a basis for developing three
hypothetical scenarios for different degrees of coordination in effort sharing,
shown in Figure 1. In the “high-coordination” scenario (first column), contrib-
uting countries agree on a common formula for sharing the entire effort based
on the indicators of responsibility (R) and capacity (C) in Table 1. The combi-
nation of metrics under this scenario resembles several existing top-down
proposals for sharing mitigation and financing efforts, albeit in a simpler
form.44 In the “moderate-coordination” scenario (second column), countries
may base their share on any one of the three responsibility or capacity indicators
listed in Table 1. We assume that each country, motivated by short-term self-
interest, would choose the indicator that minimizes its own contribution. Finally,
in the “low-coordination” scenario (third column), countries have complete dis-
cretion over which indicator they use to estimate their share of the total effort.
As under the moderate-coordination scenario, we assume that countries would
choose the indicator that requires them to pay the smallest amount.
The results indicate that under a low-coordination scenario, the sum of
pledges would fall considerably short, with only half of the aggregate funding
target being fulfilled. The main reason is that the existing pledges of two large
42. Pickering et al. 2015, 155.
43. Dellink et al. 2009, 416; den Elzen et al. 2013.
44. See, e.g., Baer et al. 2008; Dellink et al. 2009; Petherick 2014.
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contributors (i.e., the EU share of fast-start finance, the US shares of fast-start
finance, and the Global Environment Facility’s fifth replenishment [GEF-5])
are significantly lower than their responsibility and capability shares. However,
if countries can only choose between measures based on capacity and respon-
sibility, the sum of pledges falls short of the target by considerably less (about
14 percent). This is because national income and emissions levels are correlated,
so the scope for minimizing each country’s contribution is limited.45
Evaluating the Coordination Scenarios
These scenarios illustrate the risk that an uncoordinated approach to effort shar-
ing could result in a significant shortfall in funding. The broader the range of
metrics from which countries can choose, the larger the shortfall if countries
seek to minimize their contributions. As noted above, the larger the absolute
size of the funding target, the larger the absolute size of the shortfall under a
Figure 1
Comparing Degrees of Coordination in Effort Sharing
Abbreviations: R, responsibility; C, capacity. Responsibility shares for the high-coordination scenario are based on
the average of current (2008–2011) and cumulative (1990–2011) shares of Annex II emissions. Under the
moderate- and low-coordination scenarios, EU Annex II member states choose their lowest indicator individually,
rather than as a bloc.
45. Bassetti et al. 2013.
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given scenario, and the less feasible it will be for individual countries to do
more than their fair share to bridge the gap. Accordingly, moderate or high
coordination appears necessary to secure adequate funding.
How do the scenarios fare on the criteria of procedural and substantive
fairness? Beginning with the low-coordination scenario, one could argue that
allowing countries to base their shares on prior pledges is procedurally fair,
since those pledges constitute a precedent previously accepted by other contrib-
utors as credible. Thus, one might argue that prior pledges confer “source-based
legitimacy” as to a country’s share—that is, legitimacy that derives from the
source or origin of an institution or decision.46
However, prior pledges are not robust indicators of substantive fairness,
because a country’s willingness to pay may fall short of more objective measures
of its responsibility or capacity to pay. In addition, replenishment negotiations
typically treat as a precedent only a country’s “basic share” of the total funding
required, rather than the actual share that they pledge for a given replenish-
ment.47 During its first replenishment the GEF set basic shares at around 90 per-
cent of required funding to allow contributors to make further contributions.
However, over time some countries reduced their shares without corresponding
increases in those of other countries. By the time of GEF-5, all countries’ basic
shares only added up to 73 percent.48 For this reason, basic shares have become
increasingly inadequate as a guide for future funding efforts.
A broader concern about low coordination relates to the ability of coun-
tries to choose from a diverse range of indicators. One could argue that the low-
coordination scenario ranks better than the others on procedural fairness, since
it gives each country greater ownership over how it frames its share. However,
such an approach fares poorly on other aspects of procedural fairness, including
transparency and quality of deliberation among countries, since each country
may simply choose its own metric without justification.
By narrowing down the possible metrics to a more objectively justifiable
range, the moderate- and high-coordination scenarios improve on the substan-
tive fairness of the low-coordination scenario. As Figure 1 shows, the high-
coordination scenario fares better than the moderate-coordination scenario on
adequacy. But a major challenge for the high-coordination scenario is whether
such an approach is politically feasible, given the resistance of many countries
to formulaic approaches.
Scales of contribution have been adopted for several other multilateral
funding mechanisms—including the UN budget for peacekeeping and core
operations, the UNFCCC’s operating budget, and contributions to the Ozone
Fund.49 However, these approaches generally apply to situations in which the
46. Bodansky 1999, 612.
47. Global Environment Facility 2013, 3.
48. GEF 2013, 3, 10.
49. Haites and Mwape 2013, 163.
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size of the collective funding effort is substantially smaller. The UN peace-
keeping budget for fiscal year 2014–2015, for example, is approximately US
$7 billion.50 The larger the proportion of a country’s income that a scale of
contribution covers, the more likely it is that countries will raise concerns about
their fiscal sovereignty. Thus, while a larger collective target makes some degree
of coordination more important, it may also make a high degree of coordina-
tion more politically vexed.
Policy Options
These observations suggest that the moderate-coordination scenario, despite
resulting in a limited shortfall, may nevertheless be preferable to the high-
coordination scenario, because it is more politically feasible while also faring
reasonably well on substantive fairness.
A moderate-coordination scenario could be implemented in a number of
ways. Under Benito Müller’s “preference score” approach, which other researchers
have applied to pledges for the Green Climate Fund, countries vote on their
preferred effort-sharing indicator (assumed to be the indicator that minimizes a
country’s own contribution).51 The votes for each indicator, weighted by the
population of each country, are then tallied up to obtain the weighting of each
indicator in the overall effort-sharing metric.
Although this approach is elegant and arguably procedurally fair in giving
each citizen of a contributing country equal representation in determining the
distribution of national efforts, it still requires countries to agree on an integ-
rated formula. Introducing a limited degree of choice may not be sufficient to
overcome the resistance of countries that are reluctant to adopt a formulaic
approach on principle.
An alternative—and in our view more promising—option would be to
adopt a broader deliberative approach to guiding effort-sharing decisions.
Countries would report on their projected share of the financing effort as
well as the basis on which they calculated their share. A review mechanism would
compare and aggregate the national pledges, then report on their adequacy and
fairness in terms of a range of credible effort-sharing indices. Countries falling
well short on credible measures of effort would be encouraged to increase their
level of effort.
Such an approach would complement and build on recent moves toward
a more robust “pledge-and-review” process for negotiating mitigation commit-
ments under the UNFCCC. Strengthening existing requirements for reporting on
climate finance could help build common understandings in the short term,
and a review of longer-term financing pledges could be incorporated into the
50. United Nations 2015.
51. Müller 1999; see also Cui et al. 2014.
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review of “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions” under a post-2020
agreement.52
This approach could enhance the transparency of national decision-
making, open up space for deliberation on credible measures of effort, and
“name and shame” those that are doing less than their fair share. A common
approach to both finance and mitigation efforts could also help to achieve a
more comprehensive picture of the overall climate policy effort pledged by
each country. However, there is no guarantee that such an approach would
goad laggard contributors into boosting their efforts, although the use of com-
pliance measures such as border tax adjustments could increase the costs of
shirking while also helping to bridge funding gaps.53
Importantly, under a moderate-coordination scenario it is unlikely that
deliberation at the multilateral level alone will be sufficient to build clear expec-
tations about credible shares of finance. Deliberation at the national level is also
important, whether through independent government authorities that review
each country’s level of climate policy effort or through independent analysis
that informs national debates.54
Expanding the Pool of Contributors
So far we have assumed a fixed size for the group of contributors, namely the
Annex II countries. However, there are both normative and empirical reasons for
exploring the implications of variations in the size of the contributing group.
Many commentators agree that the UNFCCC’s Annexes are rigid and out-
moded.55 The composition of Annex II was originally based on membership
of the OECD at the time of the Convention’s adoption in 1992, and its compo-
sition has changed very little since that time, despite large increases in global
emissions and income and substantial changes in their global distribution.56
As we have argued elsewhere, there are strong reasons of fairness for expanding
the contributing group to include non–Annex II countries with high per capita
emissions and income.57
Moreover, some non–Annex II countries have already begun to make
pledges of climate finance. Korea, Indonesia, Mexico, and several Latin
American countries, for example, have announced pledges to the Green Climate
Fund.58 In addition, the BASIC bloc of large emerging economies (Brazil,
52. See Haites et al. 2014, 8–9.
53. Grubb 2011.
54. Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, Chapter 7. For examples of independent analysis of national ef-
forts, see Houser and Selfe 2011 (US), Jotzo et al. 2011 (Australia), and Kehler Siebert 2013
(Sweden).
55. See, e.g., Depledge 2006; Garnaut 2008.
56. Depledge 2009, 274.
57. Jotzo et al. 2011, 18, 51; Pickering et al. 2012.
58. Green Climate Fund 2014b.
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South Africa, India, and China) have contributed to replenishments of the
GEF.59
Scenarios for Expanding the Contributor Group
Table 2 shows a range of possible scenarios for expanding the contributor group
(in ascending order of group size) using selected indicators from the previous
analysis. Group A (which we refer to as the “updated Annex II” group) com-
prises all countries whose per capita income is higher than the Annex II country
with the lowest income (Portugal, with around $23,000 per capita annually
over 2008–2011).60 In Group B (the “high capacity and responsibility” group),
membership is based on a combination of responsibility and capacity. We have
used for our emissions threshold the Annex II country with the lowest per capita
emissions (Sweden, with around four tons of carbon dioxide per capita annu-
ally over 2008–2011). However, since it would be unreasonable to expect
poorer countries to contribute finance even if their emissions were comparable
with those of Annex II, countries must also exceed the World Bank’s threshold
for high-income countries (gross national income per capita of $12,746 in
2013) to be included in the group.61 Although the emissions threshold is below
the global average (around six tons per person in 2008–2011), raising the
threshold to the global average makes little difference to the size of the group,
since most high-income countries have above-average per capita emissions.
Group C (the “self-selected” group) comprises countries that have contributed
to major recent international climate funding efforts (GEF-5 and fast-start
finance or the Green Climate Fund). Again, the scenarios aim to provide an
illustrative but not definitive range of plausible groupings.
The results reveal a number of interesting features. First, and perhaps most
strikingly, the lowest Annex II share emerges when the group is self-selected and
national shares are based on a responsibility indicator. This is mainly because a
number of emerging economies with high absolute emissions (notably China
and India) contributed to GEF-5. Second, using a capacity indicator reduces the
Annex II share by less than using a responsibility indicator does, because several
non–Annex II countries have relatively high per capita emissions but relatively
low per capita incomes. Third, the Annex II shares vary barely at all across
scenarios if the “existing pledges” indicator is used. This is due to the fact that
even though a number of non–Annex II countries have pledged funds to the
GEF, most have not taken up “basic shares” and typically contribute very small
shares of overall funding. In most cases, their contribution is pegged at the
minimum amount required to maintain voting rights in the GEF (around US
59. GEF 2010; GEF 2013.
60. See also Houser and Selfe 2011.
61. See Garnaut 2008, 222.
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$6 million). The BASIC countries and Russia, for example, each pledged less
than 0.5 percent of the total GEF-5 replenishment.62
Figure 2 uses the indicators from Table 2 to extend the three sets of coor-
dination scenarios outlined above to the expanded groupings.
Evaluating the Coordination Scenarios as the Contributing Group Expands
The results highlight important interactions between the size of the group and
differing degrees of coordination. As with the Annex II scenario, all of the high-
coordination scenarios result in adequate funding when the group is larger,
whereas the low-coordination scenarios produce the greatest shortfall. The
larger the group, the greater the shortfall from less coordination, since each
country’s lowest indicator falls as the group size increases.
How does group size affect the fairness of the coordination scenarios? At the
very least, the updated Annex II grouping appears substantively fairer than the cur-
rent Annex II grouping, because it does better at treating comparably capable coun-
tries alike. Whether the self-selected group is fairer again is open to debate. This
group rates relatively well on procedural fairness and political feasibility, since it
involves a voluntary decision by countries to contribute funding for similar pur-
poses. But whether it is substantively fairer depends on the effect of the interaction
between group size and coordination on effort-sharingmeasures. One objection in
this regard is that, whereas countries such as India and China made pledges to the
GEF as symbolic gestures of solidarity on global environmental problems,63 this
should not be taken as an indication that they are prepared to take on funding
responsibilities similar to those of wealthier countries. This objection has partic-
ular force under the high- and moderate-coordination scenarios, in which the
Annex II share of the total is lower than the non–Annex II share.
Given that a more diverse group of contributors is likely to have more di-
vergent conceptions of fairness,64 the low-coordination scenario may seem pref-
erable. But any gains to substantive fairness would come at a large cost to
adequacy. For this reason, it may be preferable to explore moderate-coordination
scenarios that recalibrate relative contributions in a more nuanced way—for ex-
ample, by using more progressive indicators (e.g., emissions or income above a
given per capita threshold, as distinct from total income or emissions)65 or by
applying effort-sharing measures to domestic as well as international flows of
climate finance that all parties—whether developed or developing—mobilize
or receive.66
62. GEF 2010, 148, 150.
63. Sjöberg 1994, 30.
64. Roberts and Parks 2007.
65. See, e.g., Baer et al. 2008.
66. Haites et al. 2014, 7.
56 • Sharing the Global Climate Finance Effort Fairly with Limited Coordination
Options for Expanding the Group
Here we turn briefly to the degree of coordination required to increase group
size. The fact that the membership of the Annex II group is so firmly entrenched
in the fabric of the climate regime will make it difficult to secure multilateral
consensus on a formal expansion of the pool of contributors.67 In these
circumstances, unilateral pledges by governments that do not yet have formal
obligations may hold the best prospects of securing a fairer distribution of
the financing burden in the near future. Such an approach would complement
recent trends in mitigation efforts, in which pledges by developing countries
have diminished the practical importance of the Annexes, although the formal
groupings remain unchanged.
Still, as we have shown, merely increasing the group size without coordi-
nating effort-sharing measures may do little to increase adequacy or equity.
This situation highlights the need for deliberation between new and existing
contributors—as well as within the group of new contributors—to build common
expectations about credible measures of effort. As an interim measure, some
emerging economies could also informally opt out of receiving international
climate finance in order to enhance access to funding for poorer countries.
Conclusion
Our analysis of effort sharing in global climate finance shows that, to secure
fairness and adequacy, top-down coordination will be essential to set a collec-
tive goal and establish multilateral oversight standards and mechanisms. How-
ever, our modeling of effort-sharing metrics suggests that a combination of
top-down and bottom-up approaches to determining national efforts will be
necessary. Moderate coordination may reduce distortions in relative efforts as
well as shortfalls in overall funding resulting from a bottom-up approach,
while still allowing countries a degree of discretion that reflects reasonable dif-
ferences of perspective on what constitutes a fair share, thus offering greater
political feasibility than top-down scenarios.
We have also highlighted the distinctive role that prior pledges play in the
financing context—a dynamic less clearly evident in mitigation negotiations.
Although previous financing pledges arguably have some value as accepted
precedents, they often diverge considerably from more credible measures of
capacity and responsibility. Giving countries wide discretion to base new pledges
on past levels of effort may exacerbate rather than narrow an unfair distribution
of resources.68
Our analysis of the interaction between different coordination scenarios and
the size of the contributing group has shown that expanding the group at least to
67. Depledge 2006.
68. Raupach et al. 2014.
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countries with incomes comparable to Annex II countries would enhance substan-
tive equity. In the interim, expanding the group is likely to depend on bottom-up,
unilateral pledges rather than on a coordinated attempt to redefine the contribut-
ing group. However, broadening the group much further may make little dif-
ference to adequacy or equity unless the considerably more heterogeneous
group of contributors deliberates in order to arrive at credible measures of effort.
Thus, both stages of the analysis highlight the importance of building common
understandings around effort sharing. In this regard, our findings complement
other recent analysis on the importance for the climate regime’s legitimacy in
forming “shared understandings” of principles such as “common but differenti-
ated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”69
In focusing on effort sharing, we have isolated one of many elements of
fairness in climate finance, albeit a crucial one. Other relevant policy choices
include the sources from which funding is drawn and how funding is allocated
among recipient countries. Further research could explore how these choices
interact; test a wider range of effort-sharing parameters and group sizes; and
incorporate game-theoretic modeling into the coordination scenarios. In addi-
tion, further research will be required to ascertain whether and how private
flows—which are expected to comprise a growing proportion of longer-term
climate finance—could be attributed to individual countries and could inform
assessments of relative effort.
Our findings reinforce other research indicating that each degree of coordi-
nation gives rise to difficult trade-offs regarding equity, adequacy, and feasibility.
Nevertheless, by distinguishing institutional elements that require a top-down
approach from those for which a hybrid approach may be preferable, analysis
of the kind presented here may help negotiations to strike a wise balance, ensur-
ing that contributors do their fair share in helping poorer countries and safe-
guarding the credibility of the global climate regime.
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